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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SILVER KING COALITION 
:MINES COMPANY, a corporation 
and CONTINENTAL CASUALTY 
CO 1IP ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH and LORNA MITCHELL, 
Widow of Glade Mitchell, Deceased, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIF'FS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8029 
This case is here by certiorari to review an award of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah to Lorna Mitchell 
against the plaintiffs for the death of her husband 
claimed to be due to an occupational disease, to wit: 
silicosis. 
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The case was heard by the Industrial Commission 
January 28, 1953. On March 30, 1953, the Industrial 
Conunission notified plaintiffs herein in writing that 
it had made and entered its decision awarding Lorna 
:Mitchell compensation, medical and hospital expenses 
and burial allowance to be paid for by the plaintiffs 
herein; on April24, 1953, plaintiffs applied to the Indus-
trial Commission for rehearing which petition for rehear-
ing, plaintiffs were notified on May 5, 1953, was denied. 
On .:\lay 28, 1953, this court on petition of plaintiffs 
1ssued a Writ of Certiorari to the Industrial Commission 
bringing the record before this court for review (R. 89, 
92, and amended Certificate of Commission). 
Glade Mitchell, the deceased husband of the appli-
cant Lorna Mitchell, was employed by the plaintiff Silver 
King Coalition Mines Company from 1938 until June 15, 
1949, on which date he left the employment and never 
worked thereafter. He died July 21, 1952, slightly more 
than three years and one month after leaving the emplo;y-
ment of Silver King. Plaintiff Continental Casualty 
Company at all times herein applicable was the compen-
sation carrier for Silver King (R. 9, 10). 
Glade Mitchell died July 21, 1952, at 3 :00 A. M., at 
the Utah State Tuberculosis Sanitorium located at 
Ogden, Utah, and on the same day at 8:45 P. M., an 
autopsy was performed on his body by Robert W. Ogil-
vie, Pathologist, witnessed by Dr. Elmer Kilpatrick and 
others (R. 53). The autopsy report states: "1The cause 
I 
J 
1 
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of death is believed to be due to a severe, chronic, 
fibrocaseocavernous pneumonitis, probably tuberculous, 
involving all lobes of both lungs and complicated by a 
mild to moderate nodular silicosis." (R. 54.) Prior to 
the autopsy there was never any diagnosis of the pres-
ence of silicosis. Numerous X-rays of this man were 
taken fron1 tin1e to time which were submitted by the 
Industrial Conunission to the Department of Health of 
the Dominion of Canada for examination and report 
( R. 64). This report of the Canadian Department of 
Health shows the submis.sion and examination of X-ray's 
taken October, 1947, then December, 1948, followed 
by one in June of 1950, and a fourth one in December, 
1950. The Canadian Clinician summarized his examina-
tion and opinion as follows: 
"There is nothing in the shadowing to suggest 
an occupation condition due to dust inhalation. 
The shadowing suggests an infectious process 
which may be: 1. A pneumonitis of unknown 
origin. 2. Pulmonary tuberculosis. 3. Histoplast-
mosis or ·some other form of fungus infection." 
(R. 64). 
There were also examinations by the Medical Panel 
under our Occupational Disease Law on November 18, 
1950 (R. 69), January 20, 1951 (R. 66), reports from 
Dr. Wilson on his X-rays showing no indication of 
silicosis (R. 72), a letter from Dr. Kilpatrick discussing 
the X-rays and the physical examinations of the employee 
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in which Dr. Kilpatrick ·stated under date of October 
~s, 1950, more than 2 years after the deceased left our 
employtnent: 
"Dr. Walker and myself feel that this man 
does not have clinical silicosis but he does have 
~ouw infectious process in the lungs most likely 
tuberculosis but still not prorven by bacteriology. 
Other causes for the lung disease might include 
mycotic infection or malignant disease metaJstatic 
from some area elsewhere in the body. If this 
latter process should be a condition involving the 
1 ungs, the source is not as yet evident. 
"In view of the complete review of this case 
we believe that ~Ir. Mitchell should be denied com-
pensation at the present time, pending observa-
tion for at least another three to six months. We 
do not say that he has not had some silaceous. dust 
in his lungs but we do feel that he does not have 
clinical silicosis which could be recognized as a 
disabling entity in any respect. On the other hand 
we are still not entirely able to make a definite 
dogmatic diagnosis. If his pulmonary condition 
should eventually prove to be tuberculous in 
origin and if hi& progress continues to be satis-
factory, the infiltrates which are now evident by 
the X-ray film should largely clear up as. his 
condition improves." (R. 74) 
Dr. Kilpatrick's opinion of the results of the autopsy 
is not only interesting, but extremely important in this 
case. On August 26, 1952, he wrote to the Industrial 
Commission his views of the autopsy. Among other 
things he stated: 
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··It was obviously present at the autopsy table, 
that a clinical diagnosis from X-ray nodulation 
could not be made in tllis patient and it was both 
of our feelings (he and Dr. Ogilvie) that clinical 
silicosis did not exist. ********** 
··From study of the complete autopsy report, 
microscopic analysis of the tissue, and chemical 
analysis of the tissues for silica it can be con-
cluded that :Mr. :Mitchell did have silico~sis in a 
comparatively minor degree, which seemingly has 
been a complication of his tuberculosis." (R. 3). 
Even with the autopsy report there still is no clinical 
silicosis and such silicosis as is disclosed by microscopic 
and chemical analysis is of a comparatively minor 
degree. 
There never was an X-ray of Glade MitcheH showing 
a characteristic X-ray pattern of silicosis, nor were there 
ever clinical manifestations ·of silicosis, nor does the 
autopsy report nor any of the other medical reports show 
the presence of silicosis · (R. 41 and the other reports 
already specified) as defined in 35-2-28 UCA 1953, (same: 
as 42-la-29 UCA 1943), as follows: 
"For the purpose of this a~t 'silicosis' is 
defined as a chronic disease of the lungs caused 
by the prolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide dust 
( Si02) characterized by small discrete nodules 
of fibrous tissue similarly disseminated through-
out both lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray 
pattern, and by variable clinical manifestations." 
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Section 35-2-29 UCA 1953 which is the same as 
' St-et.ion 42-la-30 UCA 1943, provides, "In case of dis-
ability or death from silicosis complicated with tuber-
c.·ulo~is of the lungs, eompensation shall be payable ·as for 
disability or death from uncomplicated silicosis." 'The 
n•cord in this case discloses that silicosis per se is never 
fatal no matter what the degree of silicosis (R. 39). 
Aside from the autopsy there is no evidence what-
l'Vl'r that Glade ::"tlitchell even had silicosis and the most 
that the autopsy discloses is that there was present "a 
n1ild to moderate nodular silicosis." The silicosis accord-
ing to the autopsy was not complicated with tuberculosis, 
but the tuberculosis was complicated with a mild to 
moderate silicosis. Dr. Ogilvie states that the chemical 
analysis showed a considerable quantity of silicon dioxide 
'"there being 12.84 milligrams per gram of dried node." 
The attorney for the applicant Mrs. Mitchell then asked 
Dr. Ogilvie: 
"Q. And I ask you whether or not that is in excess 
of the amount normally present~ 
A. Not in a great deal of studies that have been 
made on nodes, as to silica content. So that 
such a question is difficult to interpret." (R. 
27, 28). 
This nodulation was. not "similarly disseminated 
throughout both lungs" as is indicated by the following 
questions and answers by applicant's attorney to Dr. 
Ogilvie and his answers : 
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"Q. So that both of these samples, or specimens, 
were taken from the lung tissue, the, gross 
lungt 
A. \Yell, lung and hilar region. It's not a part 
of the lung itself. 
Q. But it is a part of the respiratory system~ 
A. \Vell, it's right at the root of the lung, and 
receives the drainage of lymphati0s from the 
lung tissue itself." (R. 28.) 
It is true that Dr. Paul S. Richards, who was called 
as a witness for the plaintiffs and later was made a 
witness for the applicant, was questioned by the referee 
as follows: 
"Q. Dr. Richards, were you a member of the 
committee which drew up the Utah Occupa-
tional Disease Disability Law~ 
A. Yes. And when I see other laws, I'm proud 
of it. 
Q. 1 will call your attention particularly to 
Sectiorn 42-la, on page 29 of the law, which is 
the definition of silicosis, and I will ask you 
if, in your opinion, the process which was 
demonstrated by autopsy meets that defini-
tion of silicosis. 
A. Yes Sir." (R. 44, 45.) 
The doctor was thus called upon to make a legal intre'-
pretation of our statute although even the autopsy failed 
to disclose nodulation similarly disseminated throughout 
both lungs, and such nodulation as there was showed the 
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Jll't'~PIH'P of silicosis only to a mild or moderate degree. 
Al,st·ut the autopsy all the evidence disclosed that the 
t·aust' of tl1is man's death no doubt was tuberculosis, and 
t'\'Pil tlw autopsy says that is a probable cause. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SEC-
TION 42-la-13 (b) (3) UCA 1943, HAD NO APPLICATION, 
BUT THAT THE AMENDMENT OF 1951, NOW 35-2-13 (b) 
(3) UCA 1953 WAS APPLICABLE. 
POINT II. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT THE DECEASED DIED AS 
A RESULT OF SILICOSIS AS DEFINED BY THE LAWS OF 
UTAH. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SEC-
TION 42-1a-13 (b) (3) UCA 1943, HAD NO APPLICATION, 
BUT THAT THE AMENDMENT OF 1951, NOW 35-2-13 (b) 
(3) UCA 1953 WAS APPLICABLE. 
The deceased left our employment June 15, 1949. ) 
He never worked again, was repeatedly examined clini- ) 
cally and by X-ray, and died July 21, 1952, a little more I 
than three years and one month after he left our emploif-
ment (R. 9, 10). While he was employed by us and at the 
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time he left our employment, Section -!2-1a-13 (h) (3) 
FC~-\. 1943 wa8 in effect and provided as follows: 
·•N o compensation shall be paid for death 
from silicosis unless the death results within two 
years from the last day upon which the en1ployee 
actually worked for the employer against whom 
compensation is claimed, except in those cas.e,s 
where death results during the period of contin-
uous total disability fron1 silicosis for which com-
pensation has been paid or awarded, and in such 
cases compensation shall be paid if such death 
results within five years from the last day upon 
which the employee actually worked for the 
employer against whom compensation is claimed." 
No compensation was ever paid or awarded to the: 
employee. 
In 1951 this section was amended and is now found 
in UGA 1953 as 35-2-13 (b) (3). The amendment added 
a new provision reading as follows : 
"or (b) in those cases where death results 
from silicosis co·mplicated by active tuberculo'sis 
and such silico .... tuberculosis is evidenced by posi-
tive laboratory sputum tests and X-rays and 
other clinical findings, and in such cases compen-
sation shall be paid if such death results within 
five years from the last day upon which the 
employee actually worked for the employer 
against whom compensation is claimed." 
(Under Point II we shall contend that the evidence 
here does not even comply with this provision, but for 
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the purpose of discussing Point I we will assume that 
the statute waH antended to extend the period from two 
year~ to five years.) 
rrhe <'OUJ't Will note that the foregoing statutes 
imp<):)e on every employer a liability for the payment of 
<'Oiltpen~ation to dependents of employees whose de·ath 
results from an occupational disease and the prorvisions 
of the ::5tatute authorizing recovery also specify as a part 
of the right the tune within which the action shall be 
brought. The courts of this country uniforntly hold 
that such lilniting provisions are not statutes of limita-
tion but are qualifications and conditions restricting the 
rights granted by the statutes and must be strictly com-
plied with. They cannot be made retroactive. The 
Supreme Court of the United States in Western Fuel 
Com,parvy vs. Garcia, 257 U. S. 233, 66 L. Ed. 210, specifi-
cally held that the limitation of time in the death statute 
was not a statute of limitation, but was a part of the 
right itself. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Michigan 
in Bement vs Grand Rapids and I Ry. Co-., 160 N. W. 
424, declared that when a statute creates a right con-
ditioned on its enforcement within a specified time that 
is not a limitation .of remedy but is a part of the right 
itself; that the tilne :specified is a limitation of the 
liability itself. 
See also Mejia vs. U. 8. 152 Fed. (2d) 686 (5th Cir. 
La. 1946), Sebol vs. Peeoe, 76 N. E. (2d) 84 (Ohio, 1947). 
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This court held in Pacific Employers I nsuranc:e 
Company t:s. Industrial Comm~·ssion, 108 U 123, 157 P. 
(:2d) 800, 803, that the date of the last exposure is the 
date which fixes the liability of the employer and con-
sequently also attaches liability to the employer's insur-
ance carrier as of that date. The last exposure was June 
15, 1949. 
Our statute 68-3-3 UCA 1953 provides that "No part 
of these reYised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly 
so declared." There is not such declaration in the 1951 
amendment, nor in the 1953 Code. It seems quite clear 
that the statute creating the right also limited the time 
for its application; that time expired and with it expired 
the right. 
This employee terminated his employment with us 
June 15, 1949. At that time the law provided that his 
death must occur within two ye'ars from the termination 
of his employment in order to hold us liable. The time 
period in the statute was a part of the dependents' rights 
and a part of oor liability and it became fixed when the 
basis of the right, the employment, was terminated. 
The only way that we could be held liable at all 
/ would be because of the existence between us and the 
deceased of the employer-employee relationship. That 
relationship is the basis of the right. When that relation-
ship ends our liability is fixed as are also the rights of 
the employee and his dependents. No subsequent legis-
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lation could operate to increase our liability or decrease 
the c·n•ployee'~ rights. They were fixed. As was cor-
n·dly ruled by the Hupreme Court of Connecticut in 
(jui/1.'1 l's. Conul'cl'icut Comparn.y, 113 Atl. 149 (1921). 
The (·lailllant urged that the statute was merely pro-
('l'dnral, that the right to compensation did not arise 
until dPatl1. Between the injury and death the law was 
u1ateriall y amended and the claimant contended for 
reeoYery under the amendment. However the Connecti-
. ' 
cut Court held that as the right to compensation arises 
from the employer-employee relationship, the time limit 
was a substantive obligation and that a later amendment 
cannot alter or extend the rights and liabilities. See 
also Atamanick vs. Real Estate Management, New 
Jersey, 1952, 91 Atl. (2d) 268. 
Stansu·sky vs. Industrial Commission (ill., 1931) 
176 N. E. 898 followed by Playhouse Theatre vs. Indus-
trial Commission, 179 N. E. 89 (TIL, 1932), hold that the 
rights and liabilities are fixed at the date of injury not 
the death. If between injury and death the statute is 
amended and the right to an award because of death 
occurs after the amendment, the law as it existed prior 
to the amendment is controlling and not the amendment. 
See also Draper vs. Draper & Sons, 195 N. Y. S. 162. 
Thorpe vs. Department of Labor and Industries of 
Washifn.gton (1927) 261 P. 85, holds that the amount of 
the award for death of an employee is governed by the 
law in force at the time of injury and not those in force 
at the time of death. 'The Supreme Court of Wyoming 
I 
l 
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in the case of the Claim of Heil, 197 P. (~d) GD~, at page 
696 discusses a X ew York ease, Sch;nidt vs. Wolfe Con-
tracting Company, 55 N. Y. S. (~d) Hi~, frequently cited 
as an authority giving retrospective effect to compen-
sation statutes and concludes that that case is out of 
harmony with eYery other jurisdiction and that twenty 
states and national jurisdictions uphold the rule that a 
compensation statute is never given retroactive effect 
and "assuming that the legislature had the power to 
make the la:\v of 1927 applicable to claims for injuries 
sustained before its enactment we should not give it 
that construction if it be susceptible· of any other." 
In Riggs ~·s. Lehigh Portland Cement Co., (1921) 131 
N. E. 231, the Indiana Court states the reason for the rule 
as follows; 
"To permit subsequent legislation to increase 
or diminish the compensation specified in awards 
would be to strike down vested rights. Then no 
one would be secure. The resulting uncertainty, 
distrust and confusion would destroy the com-
pensation plan itself. To give to the amendment 
the effect desired by the appellant would be· to 
confer on the child a substantive right which she 
did not possess at the time of the injury and death 
of her father, and to impose on the employer a 
burden not imposed by the law at that time, and 
would be giving an unwarranted retroactive effect 
to the amendment." 
It must be remembered that in this state the right 
to recover for death from an occupational disease is 
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purely statutory. Under the workman's compensation 
law the legislature was prohibited until the 1921 consti-
tutional amend1nent frmn abrogating actions for death 
frou1 injuries which, of course, means actions for negli-
gence causing death. In 1921 the constitution was 
amPnded to give the legislature the right in compens·ation 
<·a:-;Ps to legislate for death from injuries. However, this 
con:-;titutional amendment has no application to occupa-
tional diseases as we are concerned with them in the 
case at bar. 
There is no attempt in the case at bar to hold the 
~ilver IGng Coalition Mines Company guilty of negli-
gence in causing the alleged silicosis or tuberculosis 
which were the reported causes of death. The action here 
is purely ~tatutory with no reference whatsoever to the 
constitution or the amendment thereto in 1921. The 
applicant, the widow of the employee, is solely dependent 
upon the statute for any right that she has. The statute 
that granted her the right only because of the employer-
employee relationship also specified the limits of our 
liability arising from that relationship. When that rela-
tionship ended, her rights and our liability were fixed. 
Even in workman's compensation cases we have 
seen that the courts hold that because the liability arises 
from the employer-employee relationship, the rights are 
fixed by law at the date of the injury and a subsequent 
statutory amendment can neither enlarge nor diminish 
them. This court recently discussed the effect of the 
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constitutional amendment in Henrie vs. Rocky It! ounta·in 
Packing Corpora.tion, 113 U. 415, 196 P. (2d) 487. But, 
of course, that case is not in point here. If the 
employee had pressed his claiin for compensation during 
his lifeti1ne undoubtedly it would have been denied on 
the basis of the record now before this court since he 
would have had no evidence whatever of an occupational 
disease as defined by our statute. There was no award of 
compensation and no compensation had been paid. The 
death occurred more than two years after he left our em-
ployment. The applicant's rights expired before the 
employe's death. 
POINT II. 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE 
EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT THE DECEASED DIED AS 
A RESULT OF SILICOSIS AS DEFINED BY THE LAWS OF 
UTAH. 
Point II is probably not too important in this case 
since clearly the applicant's right expired long before 
the death of her husband. However, it would be helpful 
if this court would tell us wh~ther or not the definition 
of silicosis in our Code means what is says. It must be 
assumed that the legislature knew what it was doing 
when it passed the Occupational Disease Statute defining 
silicosis in specific terms. 
Apparently the legislature when it first enacted the 
Occupational Disease Statute felt that silicosis as a eause 
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of d<·ath wai-i very questionable. Dr. Paul S. Richards in 
thii-i <"ai-ie a:-5 we have already pointed out, says that 
UJl('Olupli<·at<'d silicosit-; is never a cause of death. The 
leg-i:-daturP definitely did not allow recovery for death 
froJtl t uh<>r<·ttlosi:-5. It apparently felt, however, that if 
the <'HlpJoye<~ had become afflicted with silicosis, and 
that tlu·n tuhereulosis ensued as a result, there should 
h<· a l'«'<·overy. lt is somewhat anomalous to learn that 
Dr. Hi('hards h<·Jped to draw the Occupational Disease 
Law which provides that when silicosi~s is complicated 
with tuberculosis of the lungs the compensation shall 
be payable as for disability or death from uncomplicated 
silicosis, when Dr. Richards expressly testifies that there 
is never death or injury from uncomplicated silicosis. 
Be all that as it Inay, our statute says that silicosis to 
be compensable n1ust cause a characteristic X-ray pat-
tern; that it n1ust be similarly disseminated throughout 
both lungs, that there must be "variable clinical mani-
festations." None of these requirements appear here. 
Even the a1nendment of 1951 requires in order to apply 
the fi Ye-year provision that there be, "or (b) in those 
cases where death results from silicosis complicated by 
active tuberculosis and such silico-tuberculosis is evi-
denced by positive laboratory sputum tests and X-rays 
and other clinical findings." (Emphasis added.) In this 
case there were no positive sputum tests, there were no 
X-ray findings, no clinical finding, variable or otherwise, 
so that there is no evidence of the existence of silicosis 
as defined in the Occupational Disease Act. 
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It semns to us that the facts in this en~e clearly 
demonstrate the reason for the requirement~ in the 
legislative definition. If silicosis is to be considered as 
a death causing factor it must be of such an extent that 
it will be disclosed by an X-ray, it must be extensive, it 
must be similarly disseminated throughout both lungs, 
there must be clinical evidence. In the case at bar the 
silicosis did not even appear in an X -ray and such find-
ings as we have, not clinical but microscopic and chemical, 
show only the presence of a mild to moderate silicosis. 
The legislature must have felt that under such circum-
stances silicosis could not be the cause of death, and 
therefore, the employer should not be subjected to lia-
bility in a case such as we have here. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the applicant's claim 
for compensation never did arise and that under the 
evidence in this case there is no silicosis for which com-
pensation could be paid. The award of the Industrial 
Commission should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR. 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
411 Utah Oil Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
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